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The copious extracts given in this article are enough to show what these pretensions are worth. The forgeries of Lander, Ireland, and George Psalmanazar, however flagitious in design, were executed with so much spirit, learning, and imagination, that they have secured for themselves a place, though not an enviable one, in literary history. But this fabrication by Mr. Lanman, while it equals theirs in audacity, is so feeble and puerile, that our notice of it can but create a brief delay in its speedy passage to oblivion. There was a risk, however, that it might be fished up at a future day by some mousing historian, and quoted as the evidence of an eyewitness in relation to the aspect of the country, the condition of the Indians, and the conduct of the white traders at the present time in the region about the Upper Mississippi and Lake Superior. This danger, we think, is now sufficiently obviated.

ART. VIII. — *Considerations upon the Nature and Tendency of Free Institutions*. By FREDERICK GRIMKE. Cincinnati: H. W. Derby & Co. 1848. 8vo. pp. 544.

THIS work is from the pen of Judge Grimke, late of the Supreme Court of Ohio. It is a work full of thought, fair, tolerant, and based on much study; as we hope to show our readers by the extracts which we shall presently offer. But at the outset, we must present several objections to its outward intellectual form, — if such a phrase is intelligible. It has, for example, no Index, and nothing that deserves to be called a Table of Contents; the headings of the various Chapters but very imperfectly suggest the topics discussed in them; and no analysis, at the commencement or close of the work, lays open to us the plan of arrangement which existed in the author's mind. Nay, a complete perusal of the volume fails to make us acquainted with this plan. There is no mathematical character to the book; no theorems are demonstrated, no problems presented and solved. It is a series of sensible, deeply meditated essays, well worth reading, but which would have been far more satisfactory if brought

before us as parts of a great whole. It is a quarry of thought, not a temple ; a wheat-stack, not a loaf of bread ; — we may doubtless exercise ourselves to good purpose in arranging the blocks, or winnowing and grinding the grain ; but most readers, alas ! are too lazy.

And yet beyond this, there is a want in the work. It is a treatise on “ the nature of Free Institutions ; ” but nowhere in it are we told what constitutes the essence of such institutions. Mr. Grimke skips the definitions and axioms of his science. Yet, we believe, one-half the world are puzzled by political views because they have never been led to examine the self-evident, commonplace truths on which the science of the statesman, like that of the astronomer, rests.

One such truth we take to be this ; — that by Free Institutions we are to understand, not those of a Representative Democracy and no others, but whatever institutions are best suited to secure freedom to any given nation. A constitution like that of the United States, if given to Russia, would cease to be free in its character, because it would, (at least in all probability,) lead to utter anarchy, and consequent individual slavery of mind, and heart, and soul. The institutions of England, for England, are in the main as truly free, as those of our land are for us. The representative democracy of France at this moment secures less freedom than the aristocratic monarchy of Great Britain.

Again ; the whole subject of Freedom and Free Institutions is too commonly regarded entirely from an Athenian or Roman point of view, — not from that which Christianity offers to us. Our speculations are Pagan in their basis, and Pagan in their results. It is generally the aim of our efforts for freedom to secure our own rights, but not so to place ourselves as to be able to secure the rights of all, and do our own duty to all. The great Christian doctrine, that liberty comes through obedience, that the whole value of liberty lies in its enabling us to be more and more obedient, and that whatever institutions favor the growth of a spirit of obedience to God are most truly free, — this great doctrine is unheeded, or denounced as slavish and degrading.

Whence came that pithy motto which has been so often dwelt upon of late years, “ Our country right or wrong ! ” It came from Pagan patriotism. It was the very essence of

Spartan and Roman virtue. But such patriotism is not farther removed from Christianity than is the intense individualism which asks at every moment, — What are my rights? and seldom or never, — What are the rights of my neighbor? And yet, by Free Institutions most men understand such as will give this very spirit of selfishness the fullest play, and count whatever would lead or would compel them to respect the claims of other men, as so much liberty lost, so much Conservatism and Toryism left amid the Freedom they enjoy. How can we explain the Red Republicanism of educated men in France? How the strong reactionary spirit? They are both, we believe, born of the same practical infidelity, — twins of February, 1848. France, with all her Pope-restoring, is torn and ruled by those who are filled with Heathen ideas; and hence the danger of her position, the impossibility of solving the problem of her politics.

Nor is it far different, we fear, in Germany or Italy. The monarchs of Prussia, Austria, and Naples, in their vacillating careers, have been moved by no spirit of love for their subjects, no thought of the rights of the people over whom God has placed them; neither have those people, burgesses or proletaries, been more considerate of the claims of their sovereigns, or those of their fellow subjects. The spirit which was present to so great an extent in the leaders of our Revolution, in Washington, Jay, Jefferson, Adams, Franklin, — the spirit of Christian justice, the spirit which urged them to seek the good of all, to secure the rights of all, — is unknown, it would seem, in these European revolutions. That spirit has enabled us to approach true freedom; without it, we could never have done so. When our Revolution was in progress, the problem of our future was comparatively simple, because God's truth was in the midst of its movers; the problem offered by Europe is complicated and dark beyond expression, because in its heart are working human selfishness and human passion, and not God's truth.

At the outset, then, of an inquiry into the nature of Free Institutions, we should call to mind these old truths: — that those governments are truly free which secure the freedom of the people living under them; — that freedom lies, not in the absence of restraint, but in the power of obedience to God, in the power of doing our duty toward all men, and granting

their just claims ; — and that free institutions are impossible among a Heathen people, so that liberty in Rome now, if Rome be practically Pagan, is as much out of the question as it was in the time of Tully.

These, we say, are old truths, and yet we well know that many will not admit them. At the risk of being very tedious, therefore, we offer a few illustrations.

When we speak of civil freedom, and free governments, it is always understood that we speak of something to be desired. But the liberty which is desirable for any man, really good for him, is not absolute liberty, freedom from all law, human and divine ; — it is, plainly, relative liberty, freedom from all that cripples him, hinders his true growth, from all that keeps him down or drags him down. But the amount of freedom which is good for the man is bad for the boy ; that which helps the Briton may prove the ruin of the Spaniard or the Sicilian. What is true liberty for one people, therefore, may be licentiousness for another ; and those institutions which are the source of life to the former, may be the means of bringing death to the latter. But if by free institutions we mean something desirable, and if no institutions can be absolutely free, how can we hesitate to give the title to those which best secure the liberties of the nation to which they belong, and to refuse it to such as lead to popular tyranny, the despotism of a demagogue, the dragging down and holding down of countless human souls, even though these things be done by a representative democracy, or a democracy pure and direct ?

But if the only freedom worth having or talking about is that relative liberty which is befitting the condition of the person, or the nation ; — if we are none the less free, when fetterless and at large, because the might of gravity binds us to the earth, and by its very bond enables us to move, to turn, to stand, to be free, instead of driving like leaves before the wind, slaves to the mightiest impulse ; — is it not clear, that the highest freedom we can attain to is obedience to God's will, obedience to the centre of spiritual gravitation ?

What is the essence of slavery ? Is it not the power of a fellow man over us, by which our intellectual and spiritual progress is deadened or destroyed ? Let us be satisfied, that to be absolutely under another's bidding will secure our pro-

gress most effectually in every thing that belongs to mind, heart, and soul, in all that links us to Eternity,—and such submission would cease to be slavery, or slavery would cease to be hateful. But no progress is possible without submission to the Infinite One; in obedience to Him lies the source of all growth; His “service,” therefore, in the beautiful language of the English Church, “is perfect freedom.”* But we cannot serve God if we fail to fulfil our duty towards all men, and their just claims on us. These things granted,—and they are but Christian truisms,—it is the simplest corollary that freedom and free institutions are impossible where Paganism rules, even though it be in the capital of Christendom itself.

But these commonplaces are not the only ones which lie at the foundation of a just understanding of the nature of Free Institutions, and a neglect of which, because so simple and self-evident, hinders, or makes useless all our inquiries. It is never to be forgotten, for example, that governments, that political systems, are powerless by themselves to set a people free, or even to secure freedom when it has been obtained; but that in conjunction with social arrangements, educational and religious institutions, and the inborn character of a people, governments become of immense importance; all the other agents being comparatively uninfluential so long as the political system is adverse to Christian liberty. A just estimate of this mutual support which social institutions lend to political, and political to social, would prevent the exaggerations of the Associationists on the one side, and those of their blind opponents on the other. No representative democracy could enable a nation to live in freedom if the family were abolished, property made insecure, or religion utterly neglected by the State. But the home may remain unviolated, the earnings of the citizen untouched, and Heaven be appealed to hourly, and yet the influence of a despotism like that of Turkey or Russia shall prove fatal in countless ways to the true liberty of heart and soul. Nay, it is not despotism alone which may prove thus fatal. The aristocratic spirit of England exerts upon thousands an enslaving power; the ultra-democracy of Athens was as deadly

* Collect for Peace, Morning Service.

as the tyranny of the Cæsars ; and even in our own pattern land, and with a government which, for us, and upon the whole, is as good as man has yet attained, — even with us, despite of homes, and property, and religion, the popular element of our political condition, acting through the press and public opinion, strips multitudes of the freedom which they nominally enjoy.

True views in relation to the connection which exists between social and political arrangements are, in our day, peculiarly needed. The masses of men have never sufficiently understood the worthlessness of laws and rulers to secure freedom when the system of society was adverse to its existence. Even now, the suffering millions of the British empire look to Parliament for that which Parliament can never bestow ; trust to free trade as in itself a specific for the evils which spring from ignorance, vice, and selfishness ; and almost hope to put an end to the potato-rot by the ballot-box. How constant is the outcry against the English government because it does not destroy the miseries of Ireland ; and yet, the main portion of those miseries England can no more do away by legislation, than she can legislate away the clouds which so often threaten her harvests. In our own country, even with the wide diffusion of knowledge which has taken place, and which has turned countless minds to the influence of social arrangements without making them converts to any of the schools of reform, — even in these United States, men look to the election of a President or a Senator with a vague hope that the triumph of one party or the other, as their own views incline, will bring about results which can follow only upon social changes. The poor but ambitious mechanic, galled by the undue influence of wealth, trusts that the success of some anti-bank candidate will do away the inequality which poisons his life, and turns with contempt from the Christian who would bring all classes together without regard to property, upon the ground of equal excellence and intelligence, as from an ineffectual dreamer, whose impracticable schemes will never remove the mischief they aim to destroy.

But while, on the one hand, the multitude have too little comprehended the vast influence of social institutions upon politics and individual freedom, there is, on the other side, a growing body of thinking and enthusiastic men who are dis-

posed to underrate the power of political systems, and care too little for the machinery of government. To them the limits of the veto power, the theory of representation, the tenure of judicial offices, the mode of choosing judges, and a hundred similar questions, are matters of no moment. Social reform, land reform, absorb all their energies. They are not, what we wish the ultraists on either side would become, at once men of to-day and of the future; advocates for some small, but most needful reformation, and at the same time prophets of, and pleaders for, a reformation which shall go to the root of existing evils, and prepare the way for the second coming of our Lord.

At the threshold, then, of our inquiry, we would keep clearly in mind, first, that those are free governments which secure the whole spiritual freedom of the persons living under them; secondly, that the essence of freedom is a complete capability of serving God and man; thirdly, that free institutions must rest on Christian, and not Pagan, ideas of liberty; fourthly, that no political institutions of themselves, unconnected with social, educational, and religious appliances, can regenerate a State; and fifthly, that no social, educational, and religious changes, of themselves, unconnected with political reforms, are able to accomplish what is desired by us all.

There is another thought, almost as simple and self-evident as the above, which meets us at the outset of our examination. It is, that true freedom, being the capability of serving God and man, is not a mere negative thing, the absence of slavery. Most men regard the perfection of free institutions as lying in the fact that they leave every man in a great measure to do as he pleases; they neither hinder him, nor help him; they are free institutions because they are, practically, no institutions at all. But to us it seems that a truly free government will have its positive, as well as its negative side. It not only will not hinder, but it will help. It is not freedom to be let alone; *laissez faire* is not the motto of Christian liberty. The common saying, that the best government is that in which there is the least legislation, appears to us an entire fallacy. We do not want bad laws, despotic whims, or popular caprices; but we do need an abundance of good laws, whereby those things may be done which can be done only

by a nation ; laws to secure the advance of the higher and less material interests which the individual in his selfishness so constantly neglects. We may trust every man to manage in a great degree his own commercial, agricultural, worldly matters ; the *laissez faire* of the French merchants was sensible advice, for the children of this world are wise in their generation. But Art, Science, Literature, Education, Religion, — these things need constant aid, countenance, support from the nation. There are then, when we come to discuss Free Institutions, these two questions ; — What will hinder true freedom ? What will advance and increase it ? In the discussion of these two inquiries, were they dealt with in an exhaustive manner, every topic, we conceive, would be taken up which Grimke, Brougham, De Tocqueville, or any other writer, has considered, and taken up under relations that would make it far more intelligible than it can be when out of its natural and vital connection, just where chance brings us upon it.

We have neither space nor inclination to pursue the consideration of these queries ; but is it not plain that, with the Christian idea of freedom before us, we at once dispose of the first topic which suggests itself ; namely, what are the adverse influences of Despotism, Constitutional Monarchy, Aristocracy, Democracy, and Anarchy ? Dispose of it, we mean, by instantly rejecting the Despotism and the Anarchy, as being deadly to “the complete capability of serving God and man,” which we have assumed as the essence of freedom ; and by accepting Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, as being, — each for some state of society, some point of national progress, — fitted to help, not deaden, this service of our Maker and our brother. If we are asked, why accept them ? we answer, because in England, as she has been and is, and in these United States, we see these three institutions upholding, securing, and forwarding the freedom that comes from on High.

And now we draw near to Mr. Grimke, who means by Free Institutions, (as we gather from the work, for he nowhere defines his meaning,) those of a Representative Democracy. His “Considerations” are truly upon the nature and tendency of the institutions of a Representative Democracy, and especially of that embodied in our land. He nowhere presents

the arguments which may be used in favor of an Aristocracy, for instance, in certain stages of social progress. To be sure, there is a chapter on "Aristocratical Institutions," (Book III. Chap. V.); but it treats of any thing rather than that which we speak of; presenting mainly the objections to an Aristocracy, its want of adaptation to the United States, and other points of the kind. With our views, therefore, we cannot regard Mr. Grimke's volume as treating, truly, of "free" institutions; but as treating of one class of such, — namely, of those which belong to our own system, those of a Representative Democracy. With this understanding, we enter upon a more particular notice of his work.

He treats, first, of the science of government, which, he remarks, has remained nearly stationary during the last two hundred years. Is this true? Did our revolutionary forefathers do nothing for the philosophy of government? Did not those who wrought the English Revolution of 1688 do any thing for it? Has the whole progress, — (for it must have been progress, if it has not been regress, — no man or nation stands still, — to Heaven or Hell is the inevitable law,) — has the whole progress, we would ask, of England, France, and America, to go no farther, since 1648, since the peace of Westphalia and the death of Charles on the scaffold, — done nothing to aid Hungary in her struggle, or to save Germany from lawlessness? Are books the sole things which carry forward science? Are political writers any thing more than the recorders of what statesmen prove to be true, or, at most, the suggesters of what statesmen may try, but which, till tried, is worthless? In his whole work there is no paragraph from which we so entirely dissent as that with which our author opens his essay. Within the last two hundred years, we believe, as much comparative progress has been made in the science of government as in that of chemistry. The old dreams of alchemy were scarcely more worthless and false than were those of the combatants in the time of Cromwell; — there was a purpose and a spirit of truth in both, and in both an utter falsity of means and appliances. Think of it; but two hundred years ago, in other sciences than politics, there were Bacon, (1626,)* Galileo, (1642,)

* We give the date of death.

Harvey, (1657,) Napier, (1614,) and countless others of almost equal notoriety. Has physical science gained so much since their day, and has political science gained nothing?

Having assigned the causes for this supposed absence of progress in political science, our author next goes on to develop his views in relation to the various classes of governments;—which he finds to be but two in number, natural and artificial, “a representative republic” being the only example of the former. Next follows a Chapter upon the foundation of government and the right of the majority to rule. In the course of his discussion of these matters, Mr. Grimke makes the following remarks, which are indeed eminently true, and which refer to facts that may well lead us to hope for our country and its liberties; the spirit of loyalty is not dead within us while our constitutions are respected by the masses of the people.

“During the last twenty-five years, we have witnessed repeated attempts, by the legislatures of several of the American States, to violate their respective constitutions, and sometimes even that of the federal government. In every instance the attempt has been abortive. So many of the people have abandoned the party in power, that it became utterly powerless in the accomplishment of its plans; and, after a time, the whole community returned with renewed satisfaction to the wise and salutary maxims which had been handed down to them by their fathers.

“The constitution of Ohio was framed in 1802, when the population was a handful. It has now become a populous and powerful community; so that it has outgrown its constitution, as the man outgrows the clothes which he wore when a boy. Great inconvenience has been experienced in consequence of some of the provisions of that constitution; yet the people have submitted patiently to them, because, although a majority has constantly during the last twenty years been in favor of an alteration, yet the time has not arrived when the constitutional majority of two-thirds could be obtained.” p. 23.

In the course of his third chapter, our author presents, though somewhat vaguely, his views in reference to a most important topic; the connection, namely, between the representative and his constituents. We extract what he says.

“It is time now to direct the attention of the reader to a very material distinction, already hinted at, between a representative

republic and the artificial forms of government. In the first, the political authority of the community is divided into three classes : the powers which are exercised by the government, those exercised by the people, and those reserved to the people. In pure monarchy, and aristocracy, there is but one class. The whole power is centered in the government. In the United States, it is common to make two classes only ; the second is left out. All the active power of the community is supposed to be conferred upon the government, and all its latent power to be lodged with the people ; liable to be roused to activity whenever a convention is assembled for the purpose of forming a new constitution. But this is a very imperfect view of the structure of the American government. The powers actually exercised by the people are numerous, and of great importance. I have no reference now to the distribution of authority between the federal and state governments. That does in reality give rise to a fourth class, which it is not now necessary to notice.

“ First, if we could consider the various persons who are chosen to perform the duties of the great number of offices which exist in representative government, as naked instruments, mere conduit pipes, to convey the opinions, and to give an audible expression to the interests, of the people, the truth of the observation would be clear. The conduct of the representative would then be invariably determined by the will of his constituents. It might even be doubtful, whether the latter did not exercise all political power not reserved. If, on the other hand, there is a considerable approach to that scheme, or arrangement, the truth of the proposition will be still more manifest. The active power of the community will be partitioned between the government and the people. The arm is the mere servant of the will. If an individual had no immediate power in moving it, but was able to exercise an intermediate control, which might be relied upon as certain, in the great majority of instances, it would still be correct to say, that he exercised an important agency in determining its movements.

“ The physician who is employed to cure disease, or the lawyer who is engaged to prosecute a suit, are the agents in either case of those who apply to them. Yet the connection is not as strict, as between the elector and the representative : because in the case of the physician and lawyer, the skill demanded of them depends upon a body of scientific knowledge, an acquaintance with which is impossible for those who have not made it a special study. More strictly is he denominated an agent, who is selected to transact the private business of an individual. And, although this trust will require judgment, sagacity, and industry ; that is, the exercise of qualities which belong properly to the agent, yet

his conduct, so far as concerns the substantial interests of the principal, will, in ninety-nine cases in a hundred, be determined by the last.

“There is this difference, however, between the two cases; that where one man employs another to transact his private affairs, there is a singleness, an unity of purpose, which it is easy to impress upon the agent, but which cannot be exactly imitated, where, instead of one agent, there are hundreds, and instead of one principal, there are thousands. The distinction is one of great consequence; and yet, it does not detract from the truth of the observation, that the active political power which exists in a republic is partitioned between the public officers and their constituents. But the distinction points to a very important end which representative government is adapted to accomplish.

“For, as in order to execute the joint will of a very numerous society, it is indispensable that agents should be employed; these agents, whose number is very small when compared with the whole population, act as convenient instruments for separating the more prominent interests of society from those which are of less moment. Their commanding position naturally leads them, amid the great variety of discordant opinions which are afloat, even in a small section of the country, to distinguish between those which are of vital and general importance, and those which are the offspring of temporary prejudices, and local feelings. In this way, the multifarious business of an extensive community is brought under some systematic rules, and a character of oneness and uniformity is impressed upon the movements of the government.

“But there are instances in which the relation of principal and agent exists in its utmost strictness. The opinion and views which the representative is appointed to carry out, are not all of the same kind. Some are very complex; that is, they require a great many acts to be done, and a variety of unforeseen circumstances to be taken into account; and there are others, pointing to a single end, which cannot be mistaken. In the last, the will of the constituent may be impressed upon the deputy as completely as the stamp impresses its image upon wax.

“The election of president of the United States is a remarkable example of this. On that occasion, a greater number of electors than ever was known in christendom are assembled, and although an intermediate body is chosen by them, for the purpose of making the election, yet those secondary electors invariably vote for the person who has been designated for the office by the primary electors. The result is reduced to absolute certainty, before the colleges of electors meet. Thus, in a case where the electors are most numerous, and where it was supposed impossible to produce any thing like harmony of opinion, the agreement is most com-

plete. And what is of still more importance, where the public officer is elected to preside over the whole population, and to embrace the greatest diversity of views, a character of unity is most effectually impressed upon him. As the extent of country, and the great number of the electors, remove him to a great distance from the people, and tend to weaken his responsibility, it is of great consequence to exhibit before his eyes an example of the facility with which public sentiment can be united to all leading public measures, and of the equal facility with which he can either be made, or unmade.

“In order to determine, with something like exactness, the closeness of the relation which exists between the representative and the constituent, where the duties to be performed involve a multitude of acts, the most satisfactory method would be to ascertain what proportion of the laws enacted have afterwards been repealed; distinguishing between those cases where the repeal has taken place, in consequence of the representatives having gone counter to the will of their constituents, from those where it has been brought about by a change of opinion on the part of the people themselves. And I apprehend that cases falling under the first class would be found to be exceedingly rare. A repeal effected by a change in public sentiment, is obviously an example of the strictness of the relation.” pp. 37 – 40.

There can be no question that Mr. Grimke is perfectly correct as to the fact that the people of the United States do exercise a direct power through the almost universal reception of the doctrine that the representative is bound by the instructions of his constituents. But it is a most vital question, whether such a power ought to be recognized by a statesman, or approved by a political philosopher. Out of fashion as it is, we believe in the view which makes the representative something much more than an agent. The essence of representation, to our minds, lies not in its convenience,—in the fact that, while all the millions of a land cannot meet and deliberate, some hundreds, who shall be the channels through which the wishes of the millions may pass, can so come together; but it lies in this, that the people of a neighborhood can select their wisest and best man, and do it with great certainty, while they cannot judge of details of statesmanship with any certainty at all. The wise and good man, being chosen, becomes, not the agent of those who chose him, but their representative; he stands in their place, and is independent of them and of the world. We may be told

that good and wise men are not selected, but violent, noisy partisans ; and why ? Because of this very doctrine of instructions ; or rather, because of that overruling vanity and folly from which this doctrine springs. "Measures, not men," has become in practice the American motto, and no one can estimate the evil that has followed its adoption. Were the directly opposite assumed, it would be far wiser ; to think *only* of the men we elect, and nothing of the questions they are to determine. But this, we know, cannot be done. Into the ground of our estimate of a man's wisdom and capacity enters our knowledge of his views on certain great subjects ; and we reject him as a representative, if he vitally differs from ourselves upon them. But this is a wholly different thing from dictating to him, after he is chosen, how he shall vote on the points in reference to which he, in all human probability, knows a hundred times more than any member of the majority that undertakes to instruct him. The idea that the law maker is to obey orders causes us to send blockheads to our legislatures ; and having blockheads, instruction, indeed, becomes needful. Could we return to the doctrine of those who wrote the *Federalist* ; could we make our public men leaders, instead of servants, of the people, we should have more heroes, and fewer demagogues and flunkies, among the Honorables of the land.

The "divine right" of the man of vast intellect and upright character to rule us is too little recognized. A Washington, a Jay, a Marshall, has a God-given power to claim our obedience. Carlyle's principle of hero-worship, within limits revealed to every man's conscience, we believe in, though we cannot accept *his* heroes. But the opposite principle, of worshipping the most available, moulding the common clay into an idol and bowing down to it, we utterly detest. We can sympathize, with all our dislike of his principles, in the election of a Jackson, but never in that of a Polk.

Our author next goes on to examine the principle of equality and its limits ; the electoral franchise ; the "election of the public officers ;" and, in his seventh chapter, he treats of the effect of political parties in a republic. From this last essay we propose to make a considerable extract ; but, before doing so, we would for a moment illustrate,

from that headed "The election of the Public Officers," what we said at the commencement of our article, in reference to the difficulty of learning from the headings of the chapters what subjects were spoken of in them. The Chapter in question (Book I. Chap. VI.) is headed as stated above in the body of the work; and in the Table of Contents, it is described by the words, "The mode of electing the public officers." Let us now look into it and analyze what it contains. The following topics in succession come up:—

1. The influence of office-holding on the officer in a representative government.
 2. Representation unknown to the ancients.
 3. Different applications of the elective principle by Ancients and Moderns.
 4. A property qualification for office-holders.
 5. Duration of term of office.
 6. Compensation of public officers.
 7. Number of offices in a republic, and subdivisions of a country with a view to offices.
 8. Federal and State governments in the United States.
 9. Legislation in the United States.
 10. American contrasted with European system.
 11. Local jurisdictions and elections.
 12. Modes of election by the whole nation; by divisions; by subdivisions, each sending one representative.
- In reference to parties, we make the following extract:—

"It is curious to notice the manner in which parties deal with each other, and to watch the process by which opinions are communicated from one to the other. For parties would be without meaning and without utility, if they were eternally to battle with each other with no other result than the alternate loss and acquisition of power. The desire to obtain the ascendancy may be the moving spring which actuates each; but fortunately this spring cannot be set in motion in a country of free institutions, without rousing a prodigious amount of reflection among a very large portion of the population. Doubtless the true use of parties is very far from being to administer provocatives to demagogues to gratify their private ambition. Their selfish views may be necessary in order to animate them in the pursuit of certain opinions. But the moment these opinions are promulgated they are subjected to a searching examination in all parts of society, because they are felt to have a practical bearing upon the substantial interests

of all. The true office of parties, then, is to elicit and make manifest the amount of truth which belongs to the tenets of each ; so that the great body of the people, who belong to no party save the party of their country, may be both easily and understandingly guided in the path they pursue.

“ In the progress of the struggle which takes place between parties, they will often be very equally balanced, and each will, for a time, alternately acquire the ascendancy. The first time that the party, which before had been habitually in the minority, attains a decided preponderance, is felt as a presage of permanent success. The new opinions are then deemed to be practicable. Old associations are broken, and a new impulse is given to the new party. The party which had been accustomed to carry every thing, falls back into the minority ; and this example of the instability of power sets every one a thinking, and even amid the strife of politics, produces more prudence and moderation. The party in the minority, and now discarded from power, is at first disposed to cling to its most extreme opinions. Its pride has been wounded, and its ambition disappointed. It has no idea of turning to any set of opinions upon compulsion. But a popular party contains a vast number of individuals whose temperaments, modes of thinking, and opportunities of information, are often exceedingly different, and whom it is impossible to fashion as you would a close body into one unalterable form. Reflection sooner or later takes the place of passion. And as the attachment of individuals to their own independent opinions is often much stronger than to the opinions of a party, every assurance is afforded that the new and enlightened opinions which have been introduced into the public administration will not only be the rule for the party in power, but that they will spread their influence more or less over the men of all parties. Every one soon sees that there is really no such thing as compulsion in representative government ; and that if a system of policy has fairly won over a majority of the suffrages of twenty millions of people, a very considerable portion of truth, to say the least, must belong to that system. They recollect that as no one man can represent the whole of humanity, so no one party can represent the whole truth in politics. Thus the minds of many, who were most obstinately set in the opposite direction, are gradually opened to the reception of new opinions. They begin to declare, for the first time, that some very important changes were necessary to secure the well being of the state. Great numbers openly go over to the opposite party ; some from settled conviction, others from a sort of instinctive feeling that all was not right before. This gives additional strength to the majority, which, when it does not advance merely novel opinions, but appeals to truth and to the judgment

of mankind, is sure to retain the supremacy for a considerable period. Every thing then becomes fixed and settled.

“ But this very fixation of every thing, so delightful to those who have been tormented by anxiety, and tossed by contrary hopes and fears, is not to last forever. This state of repose is often as fatal to the maintenance of free institutions, as the ill-regulated ambition of parties. Prosperity corrupts parties, as well as individuals. The long enjoyment of power persuades those who have possessed it, that it can never be wrested from them. Abuses, though not perhaps of the same kind, break out again. These abuses gain strength gradually. They are fortified by the prejudices which the prescription of time creates, as well as by the self-interest and cupidity of the leaders of party. Any attempt to root them up is regarded as before as an attempt to change fundamental usages, and to tamper with the vital interests of the community. Then commences a new struggle, very much resembling the former; the same circle of opinions will be described as in the former revolution. Every thing will again be set right, without shedding one drop of blood, without the employment of any other instrumentality than the simple dropping of the ballot. But it may happen that the new opinions which now spring up will not be entitled to as entire confidence as in the former revolution. In the progress of the controversy, each party will cause some portion of its own opinions to be adopted. The issue will not be so decisive. A new party, or probably an old party, with views greatly modified, will succeed to power, and will preside for another term of years. It is in this way, that all parties find themselves, somehow or other, represented in the state,—some virtually, others potentially; and although the government is frequently exposed to the most formidable power by which it can be assailed, that power is exercised so steadily, and yet so silently, as to overturn nothing, and yet to revolutionize every thing.” pp. 98–100.

The necessity for parties in a free government is not to be questioned; they follow upon freedom as the operation of opposing motives follows upon free will in the individual heart. Sects and parties are inseparable from religious and civil liberty; all know this, and yet all feel that there is in sectarianism and partisanship a poison, a wrong. How is this? Unless we err, sects and parties, growing out of differences of opinion, are nowise wrong, but healthful and of God’s appointment; and yet, as so many things which God has made for health and human food become poison through the presence of decay,—so do parties of all kinds, when

filled with that spirit which ascribes a different conviction from our own to a bad or dishonest heart, instead of an ignorant or misinformed judgment, become instruments of death. When the Calvinist says to the Arminian, "you err because you are evil;" when the latter replies, "you condemn me because your own soul is darkened by sin and spiritual pride;" when Whig and Tory, Radical and Conservative, infer from real or supposed error in the opposing party, bad motives and spiritual corruption, then, indeed, has the wholesome struggle become a fight of envenomed arrows; the wrestler has seized the bowie-knife; and what ought to have made stronger the powers of life has degenerated into a contest that seeks to destroy life.

Mr. Grimke's second book contains seven chapters, on the following points: —

1. Written constitutions.
2. That in a republic the governors and governed are identical and different.
3. Sovereignty of the people.
4. Political toleration, is it practicable?
5. Monarchical government.
6. Notice of the English Constitution.
7. The legislative power.

These titles, however, give one a most imperfect idea of the topics which are discussed, suggested, and hinted at in the 118 pages filled by this book. It is not in our power to analyze the mass, however; we have neither time nor space.

The third book gives us the author's views on Religious, Educational, and Military institutions, on the Press, Aristocratical institutions, Slavery, and the Judiciary. On each of these points we should like to give extracts as well as to express our own views. We can, however, select but two or three passages from the volume we are considering, and must confine ourselves to a very few observations of our own.

Mr. Grimke regards the experience of the United States as settling the question as to the necessity for a connection between government and the Christian church. We will grant that it does so, at least for our existing state of society. But there is a point which our author has not noticed, and which is very commonly forgotten when we estimate the relations of religion to the state. We refer to the constant recogni-

tion, not only of religion, but of Christianity, by our Federal and State governments. They recognize it in the observance of Sunday by courts and legislatures; in the passage of laws to enforce the observance of that day by individuals; in the laws punishing profanity; in the prohibition of bigamy; in the prevailing tenor of all laws that touch upon morals and religion. This nation is Christian, not Jewish, Mohammedan, or Infidel. Now, we may ask, how far does this recognition of Christianity by the State aid its progress? Should we not feel, if the laws took no notice of the Christian Sabbath, of blasphemy, of polygamy,—if they never recommended a thanksgiving or called for a fast,—that one great influence bearing upon individual souls was gone, and that our faith had lost one of its main and most natural supports? Christianity does not ask of the State an establishment, a State-paid ministry, or any aid of the kind; but it does ask that national acknowledgment, that bowing down of the whole people, which many in our day would persuade us is inconsistent with republicanism, or is narrow, bigoted, and behind the age. From all such liberality and progress we dissent. It is the child of the spirit of Pagan democracy. We believe that every year in which true ideas of freedom spread abroad will bring us nearer to the time when, with perfect distinctness, we shall recognize ourselves as a Christian people. Should such ideas fail to spread, should our nation become neutral in reference to God's revelations, and the words and life of Jesus cease to be, at least, the theoretic guides of our lawgivers and rulers,—then will the demon, that has mocked the struggles of France, and made vain the efforts of Italy, rob us of our inheritance; under the guise of liberality, full of life, strength, and beauty, we shall embrace that spirit of faithlessness, which is, when we draw near it, a naked and hideous skeleton.

In relation to the press in the United States, our author has the following passage.

“The political press in the United States has a different character from what it has anywhere else. As there are no privileged classes, it is emphatically the organ of popular opinion. Society is divided into parties, but they are all parties of the people. The moment the people drew to themselves the whole political power, public disputes began to wear a new aspect.

They ceased to be the feuds of distinct orders of men, and became the quarrels of members of one and the same family. And it is needless to add, that this was not calculated to lessen the acrimony of political dissensions; on the contrary, it has greatly increased it. But there is this compensation for the mischief: that instead of the terrific assaults of two hostile combatants upon one another, the power of the press is broken up into small fragments and we have only a war of skirmishes.

“The journals of no country surpass those of the United States in ribaldry and abuse. But a great part of what we term public discontent, is in reality only private discontent in disguise. Our private troubles we do not care to divulge, because hardly any one can take an interest in them; they are deposited among the secrets of the human heart. But the burden is too great, and every one endeavors to find out some circuitous means of giving vent to them. As soon, therefore, as the exciting topics of political controversy begin to agitate the public, the fiery elements of the character are seen to burst forth. All those private discontents which originated in envy, personal animosity, neighborhood bickerings, the finding one's self placed in a false position to the rest of society, in fortune, reputation, or understanding, immediately disclose themselves, and give a bitterness and vulgarity to public disputes which do not properly belong to them. Men throw the mantle of politics over their faces, and fight each other in masks. The consequence of this state of things is, that private character and personal conduct of almost every kind, are the subject of attack, beyond any thing which is known elsewhere.

“So long as legislators are reduced to the necessity of governing by general rules, society must in part be regulated by the rival passions and propensities of individuals. They who narrowly scan American society may believe that it is in danger of being universally overrun by backbiting; and what in its vulgar form is party politics, but backbiting reduced to system?

“But this melancholy infirmity, like many other defects, is designed to have a salutary influence. In private life it assumes the character of a regulative principle, by which, in the absence of any better corrective, men succeed in keeping each other in order. Nor is its influence in public life less conspicuous; for there also it contributes to put every one upon his good behavior. If the American journals were exclusively the organ of the refined and educated, their tone would undoubtedly be more elevated. But it must be recollected, that the groundwork of the human character is pretty much the same in all classes. People living in polished society have passions and propensities as well as the common people; only, in the former case, they

are not put forth with so much nakedness. It may then be inquired, whether it is not one capital object of all institutions, whether in private or public life, to draw a veil over the bad side of human nature, so as to hide from view the selfishness and deformities of the character. And the answer is plain: such is the object, wherever the concealment does not have the effect of protecting from censure and rebuke the vices which are in disguise.

“As all the parties which exist in the American republic originate among the people, and are essentially popular parties, it follows that the press is a censorship over the people; and yet a censorship created by the people. There would, consequently, be no meaning in the office of a censor appointed by the government. The institution is superseded by the very nature of the American press. Where a censorship is established by the political authority of the state, it is applied to restrain one class of publications only. No one ever heard, in monarchical or aristocratical government, of any attempt to forbid the circulation of writings, which were calculated to increase the influence of the prince and nobility. The utmost indulgence is extended to them; while a rigorous control is exercised over every appeal in behalf of popular rights. Popular licentiousness is bridled; but there is no restraint upon the licentiousness of men in power. There is but one way of remedying the defect, and that is by causing the press itself to perform the office of censor: in other words, to grant such absolute freedom to all the political journals, that each shall be active and interested in detecting the misrepresentations and impostures of the others. There is a real and formidable censorship of the press in America, but the institution is in and not out of the press. The consequence is, that the efforts of all parties are more vehement and untiring, and yet more harmless and pacific, than in any other country.

“I shall conclude this chapter with two reflections. The first is a very obvious one: it is that the existence of a free press is not alone sufficient to inspire a people with a just sense of liberty; and to cultivate in them those qualities which are necessary to the establishment and maintenance of free institutions. The press was free in Denmark, Sweden, and Prussia, until very modern times. It is nearly so in China. But in all these countries the moral power to set in motion this vast engine is wanting. The Prussian and Danish youth may be as well educated as the American, but the Prussian citizen is not half so well educated as the American citizen.

“The second reflection is, that the press must not be regarded merely as the representative of political opinions. The dissemination of information in the daily journals, in magazines, pam-

phlets, and books, on a variety of subjects interesting to the popular mind, withdraws the attention of the people from a too intense devotion to party politics, and educates them to be both men and citizens." pp. 302-305.

In his views of slavery Mr. Grimke by no means belongs to the leading philanthropists, and his views will find but little favor, we fear, among those who think and talk the most of this complicated and difficult problem. He has, however, many opinions in which numbers will coincide; among these are the following: —

"I differ with those who suppose that the worst effects of emancipation will be disclosed immediately. On the contrary, I believe that they will be developed very gradually, and that the impediments to the introduction of order and industry among the blacks will become more instead of less formidable, with the progress of time. On the establishment of the new system, in the British West Indies, the novelty of the situation in which the blacks found themselves placed, infused for a time an unwonted ardor and alacrity into their exertions. But this soon died away. They have fallen back into their natural apathy. It is impossible to induce a race to make strenuous exertions to better their condition, when they are satisfied with a mere garden patch to sustain animal life. In the small islands of Barbadoes, and Antigua, where there is hardly a foot of uncultivated land, they have been obliged to labor. But in Jamaica, where a great proportion of the soil is still uncleared, and where consequently it has been an easy matter for the negroes to obtain one or two acres apiece, they manifest the same disposition as in Hayti, to squat themselves down, and to drag out a mere animal existence. It is no wonder, therefore, that the plan of importing laborers from abroad was at one time seriously agitated in Great Britain, nay, carried into effect; nor that after being abandoned it should again be revived at the present moment. The experiment so far has been any thing but successful. It seems to be impossible to train this emasculated race to the hardy and vigorous industry of the white man. To have made slaves of them originally, was a deep injustice. To introduce them into the society of whites, and leave them to contend with beings so greatly their superiors, is a still more flagrant injustice. Even if there were not an incontestable distinction between the two races, still if there is a total defect of sympathy, arising from causes which it is impossible to remove, all efforts to melt them into one people must fail. . . .

"There is one circumstance, however, which at this period is calculated to have great influence upon the existence of the insti-

tution. The present is beyond all comparison the most commercial age which has been known. Nations do not live within themselves as formerly. Each is striving to produce as large an amount of surplus commodities as possible, in order to exchange them for the superfluity of other nations. And as there is no doubt but what the labor of the freeman is, as a general rule, more efficient than that of the slave, a nation which employs slave labor will labor under great disadvantages when it goes into the market of the world, and finds that the price of every species of produce, which is not a monopoly one, is regulated by the supply of those nations which obtain it at the least cost. The nation which employs the cheapest labor will command the market. It may be true, therefore, as applicable to the present state of the world, that when the population of the southern states of America has acquired a certain density, the labor of slaves will be less profitable than that of freemen. And when this is the case it would seem, still proceeding upon general principles, that the slave holders will be the persons who are chiefly instrumental in effecting the abolition of the institution.

“But lest we should proceed too fast, there are here a good many things which must be taken into consideration. When we talk of the density of the population, in a region where slaves already constitute a great proportion of the laborers, we must mean a density occasioned by the multiplication of the whole people, and not merely of the freemen. Our calculations, therefore, must be founded upon the supposition that the community will be able to avail itself of the labor of those who have been emancipated, to the same extent as before, and with the additional advantage of finding their exertions more strenuous and effective than ever. This at once lays open the source of all the difficulties which attend the abolition of slavery in the United States. For is it quite certain that the labor of the free black will be more, or even as productive as the black when a slave? I imagine that the reverse is the case: and that although the labor of the white man, when free, is altogether more efficient than when he is a slave, precisely the contrary is the case with the negro. None of these difficulties attended the abolition of slavery in Europe. Freemen and slaves were of the same race; and the last, after they were emancipated, slid by an easy process into the position of the first.” pp. 330–334.

Many, we think, will coincide in these opinions, but in the conclusion to which Mr. Grimke comes, how few will agree; and yet who can point out the flaw in his argument? Assume that the whites and blacks cannot unite; that no previous discipline can fit the black for emancipation, by enabling

him to use freedom aright ; and that colonization on a scale equal to our relief from the negro race is impossible ; — and what remains for us but perpetual bondage ? But listen to the words of our author, a thoughtful, calm, dispassionate man.

“ If then it is impossible to melt the two races into one ; if to transport one of them is impracticable, and to emancipate it would be an act of injustice and inhumanity, there is but one alternative : to retain the institution of slavery. We are never masters of the circumstances under which we were born. We may desire a change in every one of them. But the wise and inscrutable decrees of Providence have ordered otherwise, and we can in no way fall in with its designs so completely, as by accommodating ourselves to difficulties which cannot be surmounted ; in other words, by acting up to the rule of right, in every situation in which we may be placed, and this not merely where our duties are plain, but where they lead us over a dark and difficult way. To attempt to beat down an institution, because we were not consulted as to its establishment, is to arrogate an authority which does not belong to us. But we may convert that institution into an instrument of good. We may apply to it the same rules of justice and humanity which are applicable to every other part of the economy of society.

“ The men of the south find themselves born under an institution which they had no hand in creating — which their fathers did not assist in building up, but vehemently protested against when it was introduced by the mother country. Their course is plain. If it cannot be removed, to employ the same judgment and discretion in the management of it, as are due to every other institution which is placed beyond their control. The relation of parent and child is the most extensive and important which exists. The relation is different in degree, but not in kind, from that of master and slave. Parents by harshness and severity may, and probably in great numbers of instances actually do, cause the fairest and gentlest virtues to wither in the blossom, when, by tender and judicious treatment, they may have reared men and women, who would have been ornaments to society. And although all our exertions to produce a different conduct may be of no avail, although we may not even have the right to intermeddle with the private relations of others, yet the duty of parents to act otherwise, stands as firm and unalterable as ever, and this notwithstanding the innumerable crosses to which they are subject in the management of their household. Precisely the same is the case with the master. Great numbers of parents, in all parts of the world, are compelled to make use of the labor of their child-

ren, in tillage, in manufactures, in every species of employment. A very large proportion, in densely peopled countries, do actually task them to occupations, the recital of which makes us shudder. And if this be an evil inseparable from the density of the population, so that all efforts to extirpate it will be ineffectual, it affords another example of those uncontrollable circumstances under which we were involuntarily born ; but one which far surpasses in magnitude the institution of slavery as it has hitherto existed in the United States." pp. 339, 340.

In this conclusion we do not by any means coincide ; not because it is illogical, but because among its premises there is a vital error. If we should grant the impossibility of amalgamation ; the radical differences of the two races ; the hopelessness of colonization as a means of ridding us of the negroes ; still, we could not grant the impossibility of fitting the black for freedom, of making him a good laborer, an ambitious and progressive human being. The instances of Hayti and the British West Indies, even if we knew just what those instances amount to, would no more justify us in regarding the black as incapable of obtaining social and moral position, than the instances of France, Mexico, and South America would authorize the philosophers of Timbuctoo in concluding that the whites are incapable of self-government, and that the "tendency of free institutions" among Europeans is to produce anarchy, bloodshed, and evil. If we go beyond the imperfect and unfair experiments of St. Domingo and Jamaica, and look into the private history of individual plantations, towns, and cities, we shall learn (at least such is our conviction,) that the negro by proper appliances can be made something more than a two-legged brute ; that, although he has not that intense selfishness which gives point and impetus to every Anglo-Saxon movement, every Caucasian movement, he is yet capable of indefinite advancement ; and that it would be as philosophical and as just to keep the boy ten years old in swaddling-clothes because he is not a man, as to keep the negro in slavery because he is, in energy, activity, and selfish intelligence, not equal to a full-blooded, restless Yankee, or even to an easy, siesta-loving Spaniard, or Italian.

In his chapter upon the Judiciary, Mr. Grimke argues, and not without some force, in favor of the periodical election of

judges, either by the people or the legislature; and is in favor of that by the people. The plan of having them appointed for life or good conduct, he believes fraught with more evils than the one he advocates. We cannot give his whole argument, and rather than mutilate it, we will refer our readers to the passage in his book beginning at page 351. To many of the considerations there stated we cordially assent, and yet we believe in the old Federal doctrine of Judges for life. But these judges should not be chosen by the Legislature; nor appointed by the Governor and his Council, or Senate; nor elected by the people. All should unite in the choice; People, Legislature, and Executive. We know not how else to avoid the ignorance of the masses in relation to judicial qualification; the disposition of legislators to bargain away the bench for the United States Senate or some other equivalent; and the party bias of an Executive. Let every judge hold office till his successor is chosen, if the appointment is not for life; or, rather, let the appointment be for life, and a successor be chosen while the incumbent is still alive. Let him be proposed by the Executive; confirmed by the Legislature, and accepted by the People. He that shall be thus designated, and who shall look forward to a seat in the courts of his country, will assuredly be an able, just, and true man, and will have every inducement to prepare himself for his place. If this scheme is impracticable, and we fear it is, we have to decide which is the least of the three evils that we have enumerated as attendant respectively on the three forms of election; and this decision, till we have more experience to guide us, is obviously a very difficult one.

Mr. Grimke's closing book treats of

1. Nullification, or "The veto power of the States."
2. The Executive power.
3. The Classes of Society.
4. The French Constitution, (that is, before 1848.)
5. "Is the American Government a balanced one?"
6. The influence of America upon Europe.

As we have already been quite liberal in making extracts, the only selection which we shall offer from this portion of the volume relates to the great question of the coming half-century, "the struggle between capital and labor," as Mr. Grimke names it; to our mind, the question would be more

fairly denominated, "What are the relations which, in the light of Christianity, capital should bear to labor?"

"Capital and labor give rise to another division in society, not materially different from the classification into the higher and lower orders, but pointing more directly to the causes which, in a thriving and industrious community, lead to the distribution. The relation of lord and serf at one time swallowed up all other distinctions, and paved the way everywhere for the establishment of aristocratical or monarchical government. On the other hand, the existence of the two great classes of capitalists and laborers, is an infallible indication of a tendency toward an improved condition of society. In the United States, these two classes not only compose the population of the towns—they compose also the population of the country. Agriculture, in that community, has become a great trade. The division of the soil, while it is unfavorable to the acquisition of political power by a few, procures independence to a very large number. The proportion between laborers and capitalists is, as everywhere else, determined by the principle of supply and demand; but the condition of the two classes is greatly modified by the influence of free institutions.

"The struggle between capital and labor is one of the most striking facts in the history of modern communities. The forces of society seem to have taken an entirely new direction. Instead of efforts to acquire political power, which must necessarily be confined to a few, the great effort of every one now seems to be to acquire property. Two good effects flow from this: 1st, the political institutions enjoy more repose,—the government is not so much endangered by the cabals and conspiracies of the few, as was formerly the case; 2d, by interesting so great a number in the acquisition of property, the value of property is generally felt, and the population are insensibly trained to habits which best fit them for self-government.

"In the United States, the struggle between capital and labor presents a much more difficult problem than it does anywhere else. For, if the class of laborers outnumbers that of capitalists, and the present system of nearly universal suffrage prevails, may not the public tranquillity—nay, the very being of government, be endangered?

"The struggle may be harmless, so long as the reward of industry is so liberal as to allow a competent share to both classes. But when the population has doubled and trebled, the condition of the laborer will no longer be so fortunate; for although capital will also have accumulated, yet the objects upon which it can be employed will not have increased in the same proportion, and the double effect of an augmented competition among both capitalists

and laborers, will necessarily reduce the amount of the products of industry, and cause a much less quantity to be partitioned among the two classes. The condition of both will be altered for the worse; but that of laborers much more so than that of capitalists. The last may be able to live in comfort, while the first may be reduced to a mere subsistence. The struggle will then become infinitely more intense than it has yet been. It may give rise to formidable associations among laborers to raise their wages, and if these efforts are not successful, it may lead to serious riots and insurrections, or the ballot box may be resorted to as a more peaceful and effectual means of curing the supposed evil. Laborers may outnumber all other classes, and by the simple exercise of the right of suffrage, may cause the laws to be shaped to suit their own wishes. This is presenting the dark side of the picture, and it is necessary to view a question of so much interest and magnitude, in every possible aspect, so as to form some reliable opinion of what is to be the future destiny of a country hitherto so fortunate in its career, and to find out if certain evils are necessarily incident to a state in which free institutions are established; whether there may not be some way of alleviating them — whether they are not attended with many compensations — whether, in short, they may not be turned into advantages.

“I am very far from regarding the struggle between capital and labor as of ill omen to the future prosperity and well-being of a country. It is a pretty sure indication that the laborious classes have risen in intelligence and importance, and that they, as well as capitalists, are enabled to exercise some judgment as to the standard of comfort which befits them. It is this very struggle which permits the former to maintain something like a respectable and independent station. The man, distracted by poverty, has no time to look beyond his mere animal wants; the man who obtains due wages, feels his faculties unbound. He can look around him, and gather up some of the information which is scattered about. He feels new motives to a regular and virtuous conduct, and is rendered an active and useful citizen, instead of being a brute machine. If this introduces a new element into every calculation which has for its object the determining the proper amount of wages due to the laborer, so much the better. It cannot be doubted, that capitalists enjoy a great advantage in this respect, in consequence of their superior intelligence: that this intelligence does count for something, and although the relation between the supply and the demand of labor, is the overruling principle, yet that like all other general principles, it is capable of being greatly modified in practice. There is every reason, therefore, why, if the class of capitalists are raised in the scale of intelligence, the class of laborers should be also. For

when we speak of the struggle between capital and labor, we necessarily intend something more than the mere fortuitous or customary adjustment of the two, by causes independent of any human control; we intend that the judgment is exercised, and that active efforts are made use of by both parties in every contract of service. To denounce the struggle between capital and labor, therefore, would be in effect to lament over the improved intellectual and moral condition of the lower classes. But this we cannot do consistently. If there is any one object which every man, philanthropist, patriot, or statesman, has at heart, it is to diffuse education as widely as possible, and to lift the greatest number of men possible to the rank of intelligent beings. That there must be a limit to our efforts is obvious; but when one compares the condition of the lower classes, even in Europe, at the present day, with what it was two centuries ago, it is evident that infinitely more may be effected in this respect than any human sagacity would have predicted. That laborers and operatives are able to exercise some judgment as to the amount of wages which are justly their due, that, in other words, the struggle between capital and labor is not a struggle all on one side, is every way favorable both to the prosperity and the tranquillity of the country. It gives to the community a body of more effective laborers, and tempers the misguided feelings which would otherwise take possession of them, whenever a season of distress occurred to interrupt their enjoyment, as well as that of capitalists. The reflection which their improved habits impart to them, draws them back, whenever they are in danger of running into excesses." pp. 468-470.

We have called this question as to the true relations of capital and work the great question of the coming fifty years. No other, in our estimation, approaches it in importance. The Christian religion has worked wonders in the world, but miracles remain to be wrought. There have been mighty changes for the better in the relations between the rich and poor, since the Son of God made himself known by slow degrees to the minds and hearts of our ancestors. But after all these changes, we see only the more clearly, that the state of society depicted so vividly in "*Mary Barton*," a state which is coming nearer to us of the Western world with every day that passes, is not the condition of mankind which even a kind and just Pagan would have approved, far less that which Jesus would have instituted. There must be, either by individuals in the existing organization, or by indi-

viduals uniting to organize a new society, a far deeper application of self-denial, self-sacrifice, and obedience to the dictates of Christianity in the arrangements of trade and of manufactures; or the evils which now threaten England will envelop every portion of the globe which is physically progressive. Mr. Macaulay and others may demonstrate, by figures and tables, that the laboring classes are far better off now than they were in the time of Charles II.; but his tables omit one vital element, — the idea of comfort and well-being which men have now, as compared with the ideas of 1680. He whose views are high, whose tastes are refined, whose ambition and eternal nature are awakened, is tried, degraded, ruined by the very same life which would help and improve the tasteless, ignorant, sensual clown. In our age education, some degree of refinement, and, above all, the conception of rising in the world, are familiar to every man; but the physical independence and well-being of the laborer do not improve as fast as the requisitions of his immortal nature under the culture we give him.

Whether the application of Christianity to commerce can be best made by individuals, without changing in any degree their present relations to the world about them, or whether there is some form of combination which will aid them in applying the spirit of their Master to the affairs of life, is a difficult and vast inquiry. We are not Associationists of any school; yet we are willing that the experiment of which these men are desirous should be fully tried, but tried only among themselves; let them not force others to join them by calling upon the legislature to modify according to their notions the fundamental laws which now hold society together. This is the great error, or rather the crime, of the wild dreamers of France, Proudhon & Co., which cannot be too strongly exposed and denounced.